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Z Force on the Ground
The Canadian Deployment to Iceland, 1940-41
STEVEN J. BRIGHT
Abstract : The date of 10 May 1940 is well known for the start of the
German blitzkrieg and the end of Neville Chamberlain’s tenure as British
Prime Minister. That fateful day also opened a chapter in Canada’s
war story that, in the end, saw more than 2,600 Canadian servicemen
deployed to far-away but strategic Iceland. The Canadian commitment
to that remote island from June 1940 to April 1941 was a metaphoric
stepping-stone in the long Allied struggle against the Axis powers in the
North Atlantic, building what ultimately became a secure strategic bridge
for the deployment of the forces that liberated Europe.

T

on 10 May 1940 changed the modern world:
the Germans began their blitzkrieg roll into France and the Low
Countries, conquering each within six weeks; and Neville Chamberlain,
the stain of Allied failures in Norway having ruined what was left of
his popularity, stepped down as British Prime Minister with Winston
Churchill taking his place to fight the growing Nazi war machine. Yet
there was a third event on that fateful day. For reasons relating more
to Chamberlain’s departure than Churchill’s arrival, Britain occupied
Iceland. Landing under the auspices of Operation Fork, the British
had one overarching objective in taking over Iceland—to prevent
Germany’s seemingly unstoppable, stepping-stone march westward
from Scandinavia, thus denying Hitler the strategic advantage
of controlling large parts of the North Atlantic.1 They could not
wo major events

1  
Donald F. Bittner, The Lion and The White Falcon (Hamden, CT: Archon Books,
1983), passim.
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do it alone, however, particularly by late May when getting their
men home from Dunkirk’s beaches to protect against an expected
invasion consumed British resources and emotions. So the British
called on Canada for assistance in garrisoning a remote country on
the fringes of an expanding war. The ensuing deployment to Iceland
was Canada’s first substantial and sustained deployment beyond the
British Commonwealth up to that time in the expanding war.
Connections between Canada and Iceland, which dated
back more than a millennium, had been particularly active since
Confederation.2 Icelanders permanently settled in Canada in 1875 on
lands established as a “reserve for Icelanders” along the southwest
shore of Lake Winnipeg.3 These trans-Atlantic connections bonded
the two countries in war as well. More than 1,000 Icelandic-Canadians
served as soldiers, nurses and medics during the First World War.
They “organized in Winnipeg in 1916 under different Battalions,
including the 197th (Vikings of Canada) and the 223rd (Canadian
Scandinavians). Most sailed to Europe in the autumn of 1917.” Of
these volunteers, 140 were killed in action.4
That said, Canada’s Icelandic deployment in the early phases
of the Second World War had its roots more in Iceland’s perilous
isolation and Britain’s growing insecurity during the uncertain days
of April and May 1940 than it did in centuries-old connections
between Canada and Iceland. Hastily deployed to Reykjavik from
Halifax in the summer of 1940 by a government eager to show
its commitment to the expanding war, the Canadian officers and
men of what was known as Z Force worked tirelessly with their
British counterparts to defend Iceland against an expected German
invasion. By having their boots on the volcanic ground of Iceland, the
Canadians not only helped to secure that country, they also helped

2  
Sigurdur A. Magnusson, Northern Sphinx: Iceland and the Icelander from
Settlement to the Present (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1977), 142. Also, see Margaret
A. Mackay, “Vestur-Íslendingar: Icelanders of Manitoba,” Hermann Pálsson Lecture,
2017, Northern Studies 50 (2019): 1-11.
3  
Approximately 250 settlers arrived at the southern end of this reserve on 21
October 1875. They initially called it Nja Ísland (New Iceland), later changing the
name to Gimli. Ryan Eyford, “An Experiment in Immigrant Colonization: Canada
and the Icelandic Reserve, 1875-1897” (PhD dissertation, University of Manitoba,
2010), passim.
4  
“Vikings of the First World War: Icelandic Canadians in Service,” Manitoba
Museum, accessed 16 October 2021, https://manitobamuseum.ca/archives/
exhibition/vikings-of-the-first-world-war-icelandic-canadians-in-service.
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prevent Germany from attacking Newfoundland and Canada’s
eastern seaboard. Over a ten-month period, the Canadians did their
best in the face of significant challenges.
The German invasion ultimately never came. However, as this
article will show, Canada’s response to the Icelandic situation in
the summer of 1940 illustrated an important role that Canada, led
by commitment-reluctant Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie
King, could play in the emerging trans-Atlantic coalition of the
United Kingdom, the United States and Canada against the surging
Axis powers. The Canadian military commitment to Iceland from
June 1940 to April 1941 was itself a metaphoric stepping-stone in the
long Allied struggle against the Axis powers in the North Atlantic to
build what ultimately became by 1943-44 a secure strategic bridge for
the deployment of the forces that liberated Europe. This brief chapter
in Canada’s war narrative, an event that gets little notice, deserves
greater attention.5

iceland in play like never before
Despite gaining some degree of independence from Denmark
right after the First World War, Iceland was still under Danish rule
in the 1920s and 1930s as a constitutional monarchy, of which King

5  
References to Iceland in Canada’s war literature tend to refer to events that
happened after the Canadian troops left there in April 1941, such as convoys and air
landings. For example, see Tim Cook, The Necessary War Volume One: Canadians
Fighting the Second World War, 1939-1943 (Toronto: Penguin, 2014), 295-96. Jack
Pickersgill makes passing references in his book, The Mackenzie King Record, Volume
I 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 246. Jack Granatstein’s
Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2002) mentions Iceland once in a very brief reference on page 187. C. P.
Stacey’s Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970) is similarly parsimonious in its treatment of this
deployment in a reference on page 32, as is his The Canadian Army – 1939-1945:
An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948), pages 24, 31 and
35. However, Stacey’s first volume of the official history of the Second World War,
Six Years of War – The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1957) offers greater detail on pages 45, 78-79 and 83-85. Much more recently,
gaps in the historiography of this deployment have been further filled by Wind,
Gravel and Ice: Memoir of my Opa as a Canadian Soldier in Iceland during the
Second World War, self-published by Christina Chowaniec in 2021.
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Christian X was the common monarch.6 During this time, and with
a population of only 120,000, Iceland had very limited military or
naval capacity to protect itself from potential aggressors. Iceland,
therefore, intended to seek shelter in the gathering storm of the
late 1930s by staying neutral.7 That did not work out, however. In
the early morning of 9 April 1940, a Kriegsmarine warship entered
Copenhagen harbour as part of Operation Weserübung, Germany’s
coordinated invasion of Denmark and Norway. The results were swift
and decisive. And while there was resistance in Denmark to the Nazi
invasion, Denmark fell quickly.8 The loss of Denmark to Germany
meant Iceland was alone and its leaders knew it. They had no army,
navy or air force of their own and, with Denmark now under Nazi
control, Icelanders had to find their own way forward.
Once Denmark fell, members of the parliament of Iceland,
the Althing, unanimously passed a resolution declaring that their
country had assumed legislative control over foreign affairs from
King Christian.9 Icelanders then immediately sought some degree of
protection by appealing to the United States to establish bilateral
diplomatic and financial relations. A series of telegrams in April
between Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson and American
Secretary of State Cordell Hull worked out these requests and Iceland
secured its own diplomatic legation in Washington within a few
weeks.10 Yet, with the Nazis now holding countries on the northwest
edge of Europe—thus being that much closer to North Atlantic trade

The Danish-Icelandic Act of Union passed in 1920 was to be valid until 1940, after
which point legislatures in either country could call for a revision. The outbreak of
war made this moot. Magnusson, Northern Sphinx, 135-36.
7  
Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, “‘The Beloved War’: the Second World War and the
Icelandic National Narrative,” in Nordic Narratives of the Second World War, eds.
Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg and Johan Östling (Lund, Sweden: Nordic Academic
Press, 2011), 79-81.
8  
Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Christopher Coglianese, “Operation Weserübung and
the Origins of Joint Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 1 (Summer 1993): 100-11.
9  
“Britain to Protect Iceland as Danish King Loses Power,” The Globe and Mail, 10
April 1940.
10  
For example, in his telegram of 16 April 1940 to Jonasson, Hull wrote that
establishing “direct and diplomatic relations” between the two countries “will be
welcomed by my Government.” Hull then suggested the Americans would open their
own consular office in Reykjavik “as a first step in reciprocating direct relations
between our two Governments.” Telegram found in Foreign Relations of the United
States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, General and Europe, Volume II, 676, https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v02/ch12subch1.
6  
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routes and to North America—Iceland was very much in play for
many other countries. As Churchill wrote after the war, “whoever
possesses Iceland holds a pistol firmly at England, America and
Canada.”11 Greenland was also increasingly important, largely due to
its valuable cryolite mine at Ivigtut and its ideal location as a base
for weather stations and possible air bases.12
Churchill, in his position as First Lord of the Admiralty,
informed his War Cabinet colleagues on the morning of 11 April
1940 “of steps being taken to occupy the Faroe Islands,”13 thus
signaling his desire to lock down parts of the North Atlantic in light
of Germany’s westward momentum. Royal Marines, transported
by HMS Suffolk, landed on the Faroes on 13 April.14 Later on 11
April, in a long speech in the House of Commons, Churchill made
a firm commitment about Iceland: “no German will be allowed to
set foot there with impunity.”15 These were bold ambitions indeed.
Yet Britain had no specific plans for an Icelandic occupation in
those fast-moving days following the German invasion of Norway
and Denmark. Nor did they have any meaningful intelligence
infrastructure in place to provide insights into what Hitler’s war
machine was planning next.16 However, their assumption was that
the Nazis could and would easily seize control of Iceland as a
forward naval and air base to interdict convoys and thus choke off
trans-Atlantic trade and potentially launch operations against the

Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 138. Churchill was quoting an unnamed source
who had originated this line.
12  
See Dawn Alexandrea Berry, “Cryolite, the Canadian aluminium industry and
the American occupation of Greenland during the Second World War,” The Polar
Journal 2, 2 (2012): 219-35; Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 367-70; Carl
Christie, Ocean Bridge: The History of RAF Ferry Command (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1995), 123-46; and Nancy Fogelson, “Greenland: Strategic Base
on a Northern Defence Line,” Journal of Military History 53 (January 1989): 51-63.
13  
Martin Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers: At the Admiralty, Volume 1, September
1939 – May 1940 (London: W. W. Norton, 1993), 1011.
14  
Gilbert, The Churchill Papers, Volume I, 1052.
15  
Gilbert, The Churchill Papers, Volume I, 1024.
16  
F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on
Strategy and Operations, Volume One (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office,
1979), 127-36.
11  
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Allies.17 Iceland was a dangerous gap in the security of the British
Isles—and by extension North America—that had to be filled.
On 28 April, Churchill instructed Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the
First Sea Lord, to prepare for an occupation of Iceland so as to give
Britain “a base … for our flying boats and for oiling the ships of the
Northern Patrol.”18 On 6 May, Churchill informed his War Cabinet
colleagues that Britain “should occupy Iceland forthwith.”19 The War
Cabinet minutes of 8 May record that “two cruisers (H.M. ships
Glasgow and Berwick) and two destroyers had sailed for Iceland that
morning … expected at Reykjavik at 5 a.m. on Friday, the 10th May.”
The warships carried a landing force of 42 officers and 775 other
ranks of the Royal Marines.20
On time and without any diplomatic warning, the British naval
force pulled into Reykjavik harbour in the early morning of 10
May.21 The first Marines set foot on land at 06:20 to a rather bizarre
welcome. A small crowd of Icelanders, alerted by the rare sights and
sounds of a Walrus aircraft flying overhead, stood peacefully on the
dockside. The British consul politely asked an Icelandic police officer
for assistance in allowing the arriving Marines to make way. “Would
you mind … getting the crowd to stand back a bit, so that the soldiers
can get off the destroyer?” The response was short and affirmative.
“Certainly,” the officer said.22 The British simply carried on, with
some Icelanders watching with “neither excitement or apprehension”
while others were relieved that the incoming occupiers were British

For a review of German naval plans for Iceland and trans-Atlantic operations, see
Evan Wilson and Ruth Shapiro, “German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 19391941,” Journal of Military History 85, 2 (2021): 369-98.
18  
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 687. Writing after the war, Churchill said “to
avoid confusion with Iceland, I had directed that Iceland was always to be written
by the British authorities as Iceland (C). This was indeed a necessary precaution.”
Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 447.
19  
Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers, Volume I, 1202.
20  
Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers, Volume I, 1223.
21  
The British told neither the Americans nor the Icelanders about this impending
occupation and research for this article suggests the Canadians were also not told.
Months later, however, British military authorities regretted not asking for permission
to land. Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 49; and “CASF [Canadian Active
Service Force] Rushes Defenses Against Iceland Attack,” The Globe and Mail, 31
August 1940.
22  
Egill Bjarnason, How Iceland Changed the World: The Big History of a Small
Island (New York: Penguin, 2021), 136.
17  
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Brigadier Lammie in Iceland with British troops of the 1/7th West Yorks, 1940. [© IWM H
3864, Imperial War Museum]

and not German. Nearby, and having also been alerted to the British
arrival by the overhead Walrus, the German consul in the Icelandic
capital burned his records in a bathtub.23
Almost immediately upon landing, Colonel Robert Sturges
moved the Royal Marines under his command across Iceland to help
prevent expected airborne German attacks in disparate locations.
This included sending some men as far away as Akureyri, almost
400 kilometres northeast of Reykjavik. The challenges of being so
spread out, however, were quickly evident: Sturges needed more men.
One week later, on 17 May, 4,000 British troops of the 147th Infantry
Brigade, commanded by Brigadier George Lammie, arrived to take
over for the Marines who had been called back to Britain to shore up
home defences.24 Yet even with greater numbers, Lammie felt he could
not possibly secure Iceland from potential—if not highly likely—
German incursion and control. He therefore called for additional
support to maintain the occupation and deny Germany the ability to

Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 43.
Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 40-47.

23  
24  
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land on the island by air or sea.25 But who would help? And how fast
could they arrive?

churchill seeks canadian support
Churchill, by now the prime minister, urgently needed help to shore
up the British foothold in Iceland while at the same time he was
preparing for a likely German invasion of Britain. In looking across
the Atlantic he knew President Franklin D. Roosevelt understood
the challenges posed by a westward-moving German navy and air
force. Roosevelt had made this point very clearly in telling Congress
on 16 May 1940 that “[f]rom the fiords of Greenland it is four hours
by air to Newfoundland; five hours to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick
and to the Province of Quebec; and only six hours to New England.”26
Roosevelt, though, was not in position to take any military action
concerning Iceland, constrained as he was by strong isolationist
sentiment in the Congress that reflected a large segment of American
public opinion.27 This situation changed significantly in the summer
of 1941 when Roosevelt, whose struggle against isolationist opinion
had been bolstered by Britain’s defeat of the Luftwaffe’s bombing
campaign and Churchill’s defiant rejection of Axis peace feelers, sent
what became more than 40,000 Americans to occupy Iceland for the
balance of the war.28 But in May of 1940, with France falling and
many Americans believing British defeat was inevitable, US military
aid was a distant apparition.
Churchill had to look elsewhere for help. In so doing, the cold
calculus of the situation was clear. Losing Iceland to Hitler would
heavily jeopardise the trans-Atlantic trade routes vital to keeping
Britain in the war. By extension, losing Iceland could mean losing
the war. Churchill needed to proactively take control of that tiny
but strategically important part of the North Atlantic. He could not

Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 58.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on Appropriations for National
Defense,” 16 May 1940, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/documents/message-congress-appropriations-for-national-defense-1.
27  
Michael T. Corgan, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Occupation of
Iceland,” Naval War College Review 45, 4 (Autumn 1992): 36-37.
28  
Corgan, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Occupation of Iceland,” 37-45.
25  
26  
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turn to his own over-stretched troops but he could turn to Canada, a
country theretofore unburdened by the war’s ravages.

canada deploys to iceland
Events of 10 May changed the equation. Having not met during the
entire Norwegian crisis, King’s War Cabinet Committee finally met
on 10 May, as the German offensive against France began. Among
their decisions, they agreed to expedite the dispatch of Canada’s
Second Infantry Division to Britain and they invited the British
government to suggest what measures Canada could make to assist
in an increasingly urgent situation in Europe.29 Just over one week
later, Lord Caldecote, Secretary of State for the Dominions, wrote
Vincent Massey, Canada’s High Commissioner in London, to request
that Canada “provide and maintain” a garrison in Iceland “with
troops other than those required for the field force.” That is, other
than the First and Second Divisions.30
On 22 May, Canada’s War Cabinet approved plans to send a
brigade to garrison Iceland with the British.31 King’s diary, written
hours after presiding over this decision, suggests that such a
deployment to a remote island was itself a distant thought: “Decided
a number of important matters in the way of additional assistance
to British at this time – including sending Forestry Battalion as well
as railway construction engineers and transport, which I wanted to
have done many weeks ago. Also a battalion to Iceland. Troops to
West Indies.”32 The following morning, though, he made sure London
knew about his commitment. In telegramming Massey, King asked
that he “communicate immediately” that Canada would organise
a deployment to Iceland “without delay.”33 On 25 May, Churchill,
grappling to deal with a rapidly deteriorating situation in France,34

Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 32.
Massey to King, 19 May 1940, Documents in External Relations, 1939-1941, Part
1, Vol. 7, ed. David R. Murray (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1974), 767.
31  
Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 32.
32  
The Diaries of William Mackenzie King, 22 May 1940. Digitised version found
online at www.bac-lac.gc.ca.
33  
King to Massey, 23 May 1940, Documents in External Relations, 1939-1941, 769.
34  
John Lukacs, Five Days in London: May 1940 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1999), 82-103.
29  
30  
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Brigadier Page in Iceland, handing out cigarettes courtesy of the Overseas League Tobacco
Fund. [© IWM H 3182, Imperial War Museum]

sent a short and emotive letter of thanks to King. “I should like you to
know,” he wrote, “how greatly impressed and touched my colleagues
and I have been by the great response which Canada is making to the
urgent needs of the present situation in respect of naval, army and air
assistance alike.”35 Britain needed a fillip of some sort and Canada’s
offer to help in Iceland was just that.
Officials in Ottawa and London negotiated details of the Icelandic
deployment during a three-week, trans-Atlantic dialogue that worked
out such things as the size and cost of the deployment and who
would pay for what.36 Of note, the British said they urgently needed
an infantry battalion to reinforce the British brigade already on the
ground in Iceland. As official historian C. P. Stacey writes, “the only
battalions in Canada in condition for immediate dispatch were those
of the 2nd Division. It was decided accordingly to send one of these.”37
On 4 June, Brigadier Lionel F. Page, a veteran of Vimy Ridge as the

Martin Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers: Never Surrender, Volume 2, May 1940
– December 1940 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 145.
36  
For example, see King to Massey, 4 June 1940, Documents in External Relations,
1939-1941, 775-76.
37  
Stacey, Six Years of War, 83.
35  
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commanding officer of the 50th Battalion,38 was ordered to report to
Ottawa immediately. He arrived twenty-four hours later “and was
told that he had been appointed to command a Canadian force that
was being sent to Iceland to assist the British in the occupation of the
island.”39 Events moved apace from there. On 10 June 1940, the same
day as Defence Minister Norman Rogers died in a plane crash,40 Page,
along with a small brigade staff of what was now designated Z Force
and the Toronto-based Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC), set out
for Reykjavik from Halifax on HMS Empress of Australia.41 They
arrived six days later after a crossing that was “without incident”
save for some “seasickness in rough seas.”42
Back in Ottawa, meanwhile, King knew that sending young
healthy Canadian men to Iceland, far away from events rapidly
unfolding in France, could appear to be a diversion of vital resources
at a crucial time. In his speech to the House of Commons on 18 June,
during which he also announced the National Resources Mobilisation
Act, King tried to assuage any such concerns about Iceland by
saying “I need hardly point out the strategic importance not only
to the security of the north Atlantic sea lanes but to the defence of
this continent of maintaining control of Iceland.”43 An article the
following morning in The Globe and Mail explained that “[f]or the
enemy, it [Iceland] would be valuable either in the encirclement of the
United Kingdom, as a base for attacks on trans-Atlantic shipping,

Geoffrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci and Mike Bechthold, eds., Vimy Ridge: A
Canadian Reassessment, (Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military and Strategic
Studies and Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), Appendix 1, 325.
39  
Personal diary of Brigadier Page, 4-5 June 1940, as cited in J. C. Newlands, Army
Headquarters Reports, 1948-1959, Report No. 33 “‘Z Force” in Iceland: An account of
the dispatch of Canadian Troops to Iceland and their subsequent operations there,”
16 December 1949, 3, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/
services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/
army-headquarters-1948-1959/z-force-iceland.html. Page rose to the rank of majorgeneral before dying of illness in Canada on 26 August 1944. See J. L. Granatstein,
The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War
(Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 7.
40  
Arnold Heeney, The Things that Are Caesar’s: The Memoirs of a Canadian Public
Servant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 59-60.
41  
The Z Force label followed in the footsteps of X Force, the short-lived Canadian
plan to occupy Greenland developed shortly after Denmark fell. Stacey, Arms, Men
and Government, 367-68.
42  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 3.
43  
House of Commons Debates, 19th Parliament, 1st Session: Vol. 1, 18 June 1940.
38  
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or as a stepping-stone to North America.”44 The deployment to
Iceland aligned with Canada’s expanding commitment to defending
Newfoundland from potential German aggression and thus the threat
that such aggression would pose to Canada.45 Over the coming
months and years, this expansion would see Canada, Britain and the
US work together in Newfoundland, coordinating naval and air forces
to defend the merchant ship convoys that sustained Britain against
increasingly intense German submarine attack.46
Shortly after Page and his men landed in Iceland, France fell
and Canada became Britain’s ranking ally.47 The British Isles were
threatened as never before by the powerful German forces just across
the English Channel and in the North Atlantic where German air and
naval forces were now able to operate in greater strength from their
new bases in France and Norway.48 The British wanted Canada to play
a larger role in covering the northern approaches to the UK by further
strengthening the garrison in Iceland and in short order. A telegram
on 20 June from the Canadian High Commission in London to Ottawa
reported that the War Office wanted the entire 2nd Division “less such
units as would not be required for garrison duty” to be shipped to
Iceland as soon as able, thereby releasing the British brigade already
in Iceland to go home to defend the United Kingdom.49 The same
telegram went on to suggest that the 2nd Division in Iceland could be
relieved in due course by the 3rd Division, allowing the former to go to
England to form the Canadian Corps which King had announced on

“Canadians Guarding Iceland Against Threat of Attacks,” The Globe and Mail,
19 June 1940.
45  
Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 35. On 24 August 1939, O. D. Skelton,
King’s highly influential Under Secretary of State, explicitly alerted him to the
importance of Newfoundland to Canada’s defence. See “Memorandum of ODS,
‘Canadian War Policy’, 24 August 1939,” in O.D. Skelton: The Work of the World,
1923-1941, ed. Norman Hillmer (Toronto: McGill Queen’s University Press and
Champlain Society, 2013), 435.
46  
Richard Goette, “The Command and Control of Canadian and American Maritime
Air Power in the Northwest Atlantic,” Canadian Military History 26, 2 (2017): 1-27.
For more on Allied coordination in the North Atlantic in the post-war period, see
Isabel Campbell, “A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: AmericanBritish-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War,” Journal of Military
History 85, 4 (October 2021): 980-1003.
47  
Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 186.
48  
Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 167.
49  
Massey telegram to King, 20 June 1940, Documents in External Relations, 19391941, 802.
44  
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20 May. Officials in Ottawa pushed back, believing their established
commitment to Iceland was not only suitable for the situation but
that “public opinion would not readily be reconciled to our forces
being permanently in garrison abroad.”50 The Canadians also wanted
the 2nd Division to be fully concentrated in England as soon as the
battalion sent to Iceland could be relieved.
Differing views in Ottawa and London led to some confusion as
to the size of Canada’s commitment to Iceland. In a memo dated
7 July to Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for War,
Churchill expressed his surprise at comments made to them on the
previous day by Major-General Andrew McNaughton, General Officer
Commanding of 1st Canadian Division:
You shared my astonishment yesterday at the statement made to us by
General McNaughton that the whole of the 2nd Canadian Division was
destined for Iceland. It would surely be a very great mistake to allow
these fine troops to be employed in so distant a theatre. Apparently the
first three battalions have already gone there. No one was told anything
about this. We require two Canadian Divisions to work as a Corps as
soon as possible.51

Three battalions did in fact go to Iceland, but the entire 2nd Division
did not. And while McNaughton’s comments to Eden and Churchill
may have contributed to this confusion, his proposed solution to
solving the Icelandic question was prescient. In the same conversation
with Eden and Churchill about the 2nd Division, McNaughton
suggested that the proper solution was “to induce USA to occupy
the island.”52 In July 1941, that is exactly what happened.53

z force on the ground
On the hard surface of Iceland, well beyond the varnished halls
of political power, it was up to Page and his team to work with

Stacey, Six Years of War, 83-85.
Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers: Never Surrender, 488.
52  
Stacey, Six Years of War, 85, asterisk footnote.
53  
Byron Fairchild, Command Decisions: Decision to Land United States Forces in
Iceland, 1941 (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1990), passim.
50  
51  
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Canadian troops unloading trucks and stores on arrival in Iceland. [© IWM H 3141, Imperial

War Museum]

the British in securing the island as well as they possibly could.
Things started off poorly, however. Reykjavik’s small harbour was
ill-equipped to receive large ships with substantial loads, posing
massive challenges for British and Canadians alike. It took sixteen
days to fully unload one of the incoming Canadian ships, causing
a substantial drain on manpower who could have otherwise been
training and getting to know the lay of the Icelandic land.54 Making
matters worse, hasty bulk loading of the ships back in Canada left
many military trucks behind on the docks in Halifax. Likewise,
50,000 grenades were shipped without fuses, the men were given
boots that wore out easily on Iceland’s hard-rock surface and there
was a severe lack of rain jackets.55 Similar supply challenges would
plague the Canadians for most of their time in Iceland.
Once on the ground, Z Force, which was an independent
command from the British occupying force, set up camp just outside
of Reykjavik and Page quickly began surveying the surrounding
Fairchild, Command Decisions, 23.
Cents ans d’histoire d’un Régiment Canadian-francais: Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal,
1869-1969 (Montreal: Éditions du Jour, 1971), 97-102.

54  
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areas. Within forty-eight hours he believed Iceland’s rocky terrain
was “very favourable to machine gun defence tactics” and thus
requested “a rather high proportion of this type of unit.” His request
was granted, with Page hearing on 20 June that two more Canadian
battalions, including one machine gun unit, would arrive in early
July.56 The prospect of additional troops allowed Page and Lammie
to plan for an expanded Canadian presence across Iceland. They
decided the RRC would move to Kaldadarnes, approximately sixty
kilometres southeast of Reykjavik, where some of them would help
the Royal Air Force (RAF) build an air force station. Meanwhile,
the incoming rifle battalion would set up in the Hafnarfjördhur area
ten kilometres south of the capital. The machine gun battalion, in
turn, would try to cover both Kaldadarnes and Reykjavik by way of
British-supplied motor transport. The Canadians, like the British,
were to be dispersed across a wide area, leading Page to agree with
Lammie’s suggestion that Z Force should communicate with their
British counterparts “in all cases of emergency.”57
Z Force was joined on 7 July by members of the Fusiliers MontRoyal (FMR) and the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine
Gun) (Camerons). The Camerons’ war diary from the same day
painted a vivid picture of the foreign land that would be their home
for several months. “Reykjavik presented a city unlike any Canadian
city,” the diarist wrote. “The view from the boat reminded one
of many coloured shoe boxes set around and on a hill.”58 Seeing
Iceland from the side of that same incoming ship was somewhat more
harrowing. Years after the war, in describing how he juggled his kit
bag and bagpipes while climbing down a Jacob’s Ladder, Cameron
Highlander Graham Brown said, “it’s a wonder some of us didn’t fall
into the sea.”59

Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 5-6.
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 6-7.
58  
War Diary, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, 7 July 1940, RG 24, volume 15024,
Library and Archives Canada [LAC].
59  
Interview with Graham Brown, 3 June 1999, as transcribed by Gloria A. Morrison,
in Gloria A. Morrison, “The Voices of Those Who Served: The Early War Years and
the Men of the 1st Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)” (MA thesis,
University of Ottawa, 2001), 111.
56  
57  
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Troops move into trenches near an Icelandic farm, August 1940. [© IWM H 3344, Imperial War

Museum]

dispersed across iceland
By 11 July, seventeen different Canadian units were spread over more
than eight locations across the country. A steady stream of operational
orders moved members of Z Force around even more over the coming
months, their destinations dictated by evolving needs and available
resources. Page thus continued to face a “disperse or concentrate”
dilemma in trying to sort out how and where to focus his finite
resources. As the Z Force war diary noted, Page resolved “to try to
do both tasks as well as he could, with what force he had available.”60
To that end, RRC spent two weeks completing defences and testing
water pipes as possible tank obstacles northeast of Reyjkavik. The
Camerons were ordered to complete construction of machine gun
emplacements and to carry “out trials of communications between
battalion headquarters and the detached companies.”61 The FMR,

Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 5.
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 14.

60  
61  
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meanwhile, helped build the Kaldadarnes airport and a network of
trenches.62
Two additional operational orders over the coming months
illustrate the evolving nature of this deployment. Issued on 14
August, Operation Order No. 7 of Z Force Headquarters, conveyed to
Southern Sector, called for defensive planning “based on the retention
of forward defended localities backed up by a mobile striking force.”
The localities were defined as the coastline. “These, together with
the Kaldadarnes aerodrome, and the line of the Olfusa river from
Alviddhra to Audsholt, were to be defended at all costs.” Just over a
month later, Operation Order No. 9, issued on 27 September, detailed
changes to sector areas and commanders and assigned a new role
to Z Force itself. From that point on, sectors were to be “known
as North-Eastern (Akureyri) Sector, the Central Sector, the SouthWestern (Reykjavik) Sector, and the Western (Borgarnes) Sector.”63

ongoing supply woes
The constraints of Reykjavik’s harbour, leading to British demands
that their ships be unloaded in the Icelandic capital and the waiting
Canadian ships be sent off to be unloaded in Britain, exacerbated
Z Force’s ongoing supply challenges.64 Housing conditions were no
better. Members of Z Force were meant to live in Yukon-style cabins.
Due to a chronic lack of supplies, however, many men were still
sleeping in tents by September, with fellow Canadians bunking in
Nissen huts provided by the Icelanders themselves.65 Some of Page’s
men only moved out of their tents days before disembarking for

Caroline D’Amours, “Training for Operation Jubilee: Tactics and Training in the
Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942,” Canadian Military History
22, 4 (2015): 6.
63  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 17.
64  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 20-23.
65  
Marcelle Cinq-Mars, “Canadians and the military occupation of Iceland (19401941): from squalls to the ‘black death’,” Library and Archives Canada Blog, 5
November
2020,
https://thediscoverblog.com/2020/11/05/canadians-and-themilitary-occupation-of-iceland-1940-1941-from-squalls-to-the-black-death/.
62  
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Panorama of two Cameron Highlanders tent camps, 1940. [© IWM H 3871, Imperial War

Museum]

England at the end of October.66 The Icelandic language also tested
the Canadians as few, if any, of them could speak the local language.
The Royal Canadian Legion tried to help by giving Page’s men an
Icelandic phrasebook but the book was all but useless as it “dwelt at
length with such topics as railways (which are unknown in Iceland).”
What’s more, Page’s official interpreter “could speak and understand
Icelandic (after a fashion) but could not read it or write it, at least
at first.”67
Logistics and language were not the only challenges facing the
Canadians dispatched to Iceland. Sheer boredom was a growing
problem. The men were moved around a lot and were given plenty
of tasks. But the fact was there was no military action of any note
for the duration of the deployment for the RRC and FMR, although
the Camerons, who stayed on until April 1941, spotted an overhead
C. P. Stacey, Canadian Military Headquarters Reports, 1940-1948, Report No. 4
“Visit to Bordon Camp: Brigadier Page’s reminiscences of Iceland, etc. The War and
the English Countryside,” 10 January 1941, https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentnational-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-historylineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-1948/borden-camp-reminiscencesiceland-english-countryside.html.
67  
Stacey, “Visit to Bordon Camp.”
66  
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Panorama of two Cameron Highlanders tent camps, 1940. [© IWM H 3870, Imperial War

Museum]

German plane on 9 February 1941 in what was described as “a
few lively moments.”68 Likewise, a few Camerons thought Germans
were invading one evening, with one soldier firing his gun at an
approaching boat. Turns out it was some surprised—and rather
angry—British troops on a boat that had been blown off course by
high winds.69 Indeed, horrendous weather was an ongoing challenge.
Virtually every entry of Page’s laconically written diary starts with
terse words about terrible local wind and rain conditions. On 11
September 1940, for instance, Page wrote “[r]ain and a gale,” followed
by a brief description of “terrific gales that nearly blew our car off the
road.”70 One week later, a “sub-arctic hurricane” destroyed twenty
tents and blew the roof off the kitchen.71

Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 19.
Robert Champoux, “Invasion scare in Iceland,” Veterans Affairs Canada, video
interview transcript, accessed 19 October 2021, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/
video-gallery/video/7526/rec.
70  
Journal of Major-General Lionel F. Page, 1940-1943, RG 24, volume 20411, file
958.001 (D1), LAC.
71  
“Highland Unit in Iceland Battles Sub-Arctic Storm,” Hamilton Spectator, 18
September 1940.
68  
69  
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Private Lucien Paiement was one of
six Canadians who died in Iceland.
He is buried in Reykjavik (Fossvogur)
Cemetery. [Canadian Virtual War
Memorial, Veterans Affairs Canada]

A combination of growing boredom and prolonged foul weather
led to many cases of colds and flu.72 It was also a factor in causing
some mental health issues. Fred Hicks, a Cameron Highlander
veteran of the Icelandic deployment, candidly remarked years later on
the toll that the conditions took on many of his colleagues: “They’d
go stark raving mad. We had a couple of them go wonky.”73 At least
thirty-three men were sent home as they were deemed not physically
or mentally fit to serve.74 Page wrote in his diary on 29 July that he
“visited hospital to see lunatic. Must get him away.”75 Many nerves
were frayed, sometimes causing accidents. On 6 August, a member of
the FMR on duty at a watching station on the south coast was shot
and slightly wounded by what military investigators subsequently
called a “case of nerves.”76 Tragically, some of his comrades were not
so lucky. Six Canadians died during this deployment. Of these, three
were Camerons, two from FMR and one from the Royal Canadian

Cents ans d’histoire d’un Régiment Canadian-francais, 101.
Interview by Gloria A. Morrison, Gloria A. Morrison, “The Voices of Those Who
Served,” 139.
74  
Morrison, “The Voices of Those Who Served,” 140.
75  
Journal of Page, 29 July 1940, RG 24, volume 20411, file 958.001 (D1), LAC.
76  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 15.
72  
73  
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Dinner time on the Grótta Peninsula near Reykjavik. [© IWM H 3136, Imperial War Museum]

Corps of Signals.77 At least two of these were accidental drownings
and one may have been suicide.78
Dealing with drudgery and bad weather led some men to hit the
bottle hard. Heavy drinking by some Canadian troops had become
such an issue that Routine Order No. 6, issued on 20 July 1940, warned
“all Ranks” that Black Death, a very strong form of Icelandic alcohol,
“may be very sudden in its effects. Personnel found in possession of
this spirit or knowingly drinking it will be severely punished.”79 Those
seeking more salubrious pursuits played sports to help pass the time.
Playing soccer against the British was particularly popular, even if
the Canadians usually lost. Other amusements included horseback
The six Canadians who died in Iceland, in chronological order of death, are as
follows: Private Lucien Paiement (FMR), died 1 October 1940, age 17; Signalman
Gordon Latter (Royal Canadian Corps of Signals), died 5 October 1940, age 22;
Corporal Adrian Slevan (FMR), died 16 October 1940, age not listed; Lance Corporal
Kenneth Monaghan (Camerons), died 11 December 1940, age not listed; Warrant
Officer Andrew Currie (Camerons), died 3 January 1941, age 34; and Corporal
Edward Langman (Camerons), died 7 March 1941, age 27. See Commonwealth War
Graves Commission website, www.cwgc.org.
78  
Author’s conversation with Dr. Jeff Noakes, 6 May 2017.
79  
RRC, “Routine Order No. 6,” 20 July 1940, RG 24, volume 15, file 225, LAC.
77  
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riding, climbing, swimming and going to the movies.80 Letters from
home also helped, with the first mailbag arriving from Halifax on 3
July.81 Likewise, a small daily paper called War News, with reporting
supplied by the Reykjavik Broadcasting Station and billing itself
as “the first and only English paper in Iceland,” circulated among
Canadian soldiers to help keep spirits up.82 Page did what he could
to keep things positive. On 6 September, for example, he wrote to the
Commanding Officer of the FMR to thank him and his men for the
“very excellent work the drivers of your unit have performed” during
their “long hours on the road,” during which time the “excellent spirit
they [the drivers] showed, was very much appreciated.”83

forging connections
Undaunted by the considerable logistical, linguistic and climatic
challenges they faced, Canadian troops kept close watch, along with
the British, over land, sea and air for German attacks. Throughout
it all, the Canadians learned to work together as a formation. On
4 September, for instance, troops of the RRC and pilots of the
RAF’s No. 98 Squadron did a series of exercises together, after the
perpetually bad weather had abated, to see how ground troops could
communicate with overhead planes. They tested “various methods
of communication from ground to air, including wireless … and
drills for the defence of convoys against air attack were practiced.”84
The Canadians, in conjunction with the British, prepared detailed
evacuation plans in the event of a German invasion, as well as
undertook countless reconnaissance missions across the island.85 They
also built tank traps, machine gun emplacements, coast-watching
stations, aerodromes and landing fields that lasted for many years.
The ability of the Canadians to adapt and learn during their time in
“Canucks in Iceland Prepare Warm Welcome for Germans,” The Globe and Mail,
8 August 1940.
81  
C. D. Sayles, “Z Force: Canadian Army in Iceland, 1940-1941,” BNA Topics 57,
3 (2000):10-14.
82  
The edition from 30 July 1940 was reprinted in The Globe and Mail exactly one
month later.
83  
Letter from Brig. Page to LCol P. Grenier, Officer Commanding, Fusiliers de
Mont-Royal, 10 October 1940, RG 24, volume 15225, file 14, LAC.
84  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force goes to Iceland,” 25.
85  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force goes to Iceland,” 7-20.
80  
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Canadian soldiers in Hveragerdi in the summer of 1940. [National Museum of Iceland KL-1107]

Iceland did not go unnoticed. Major-General Henry Curtis, General
Officer Commanding of the British Alabaster Force troops in Iceland
who had arrived on 27 June to take over from Lammie,86 sent Page
an upbeat sending-off note on 30 October as many of the Canadians
were leaving for England. In his note, Curtis said “the establishment
of your force on land, the construction of defences and training
have all been carried out with characteristic Canadian energy and
thoroughness …. [I]t is our fervent hope to find ourselves alongside
“Z” Force during the final advance to Victory.”87 Likewise, once the
last Camerons had pulled out of Iceland in April 1941, Curtis wrote
the British War Office saying that British forces “always felt it an
honour to have the Canadians alongside them.”88
The Canadians were also successful in building good relations
with the locals, which was particularly important as they were
living in very close quarters to the Icelanders. In the case of the
FMR, the 124 soldiers living in Hveragerði employed locals to
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force goes to Iceland,” 7. In this report, Newlands incorrectly
spells the name as “Curtiss.”
87  
Letter of Major-General Curtis, Commander, Alabaster Force, to Brigadier Page,
“Z” Force, 30 October 1940, RG 24, volume 10209, file 31, LAC.
88  
“Canadians Now in England, British Troops Hold Iceland,” The Globe and Mail,
10 May 1941.
86  
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Canadian officers with “a fine Newfoundland dog.” [© IWM H 3144, Imperial War Museum]

wash their kits and the Canadians often bought fish and chips
in the basement of a nearby building.89 The view of the mayor of
Heimaey, an island off the west coast, is another case in point. In
October, as the RRC were preparing to leave Heimaey, the mayor
expressed his thanks for their conduct in a letter to Curtis: “It was
with somewhat mixed feelings we greeted the soldiers of the British
Empire when they arrived to the Western Isles some time ago, and
I trust you will understand that from our point of view. Now, when
they are leaving, I feel becoming to express my high regard for the
correct and gentlemen-like behaviour of the soldiers under the able
leadership of Lieut. C. Wilkinson. We could not ask for better men
and better officers.”90 As ambivalent as the initial meetings may
have been in some cases, Canadians were not altogether foreign to
Njörður Sigurðsson, “Canadian soldiers in Hveragerði in the summer of 1940,”
Krumminn, 6 June 2020, https://krumminn.is/kanadiskir-hermenn-i-hveragerdisumarid-1940/. This article was sent to the author in an email from Sigurðsson on
26 February 2022. The source is in Icelandic and has been translated with Google
Translate.
90  
Newlands, “‘Z’ Force in Iceland,” 29.
89  
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the Icelanders. Page reported that on two occasions he “encountered
residents of Iceland who had fought in the Canadian forces in the
last war.”91 Even still, there was a core of Icelanders who despised
the occupation of their island during the war.92
The Z Force deployment was not an unvarnished success
considering the opportunity costs of the time they spent there. Could
the Canadians sent to Iceland have been better used elsewhere? In
writing about wartime training by the FMR, Caroline D’Amours
argues that this Iceland interlude was a distraction from learning the
basics. Their time in Iceland, she states, “interrupted the rhythm of
individual training between July and October 1940.” As a result, when
the FMR arrived in England in November 1940, “none of them could
boast that they had completely mastered the basic skills normally
taught in a maximum time period of 12 weeks,” a deficit D’Amours
says cannot be blamed entirely on the “harried mobilization” to
Iceland. 93 Given the brief, boring and blustery time the men of the
FMR spent in Iceland, this is a legitimate perspective. However,
they learned how to survive in challenging conditions, collaborate
as a team, establish lines of defences and work with others in fellow
combatant countries.

setting the stage for longer-term impact
By helping to secure Iceland, Canadians were instrumental in laying
down the foundations for a significant and strategic Allied presence
around Iceland for the rest of the war and beyond.94 And they knew
it. On 19 April 1941, ten days after the Camerons were told to start
packing up to leave, an admiral in the Royal Canadian Navy wrote
a memo outlining the value of Iceland to convoys: “We have chosen
our battleground for the summer in the North Western Approaches
where, with the help of Iceland, we can bring the maximum possible

Stacey, “Visit to Bordon Camp.”
Laurie K. Bertram, The Viking Immigrants: Icelandic North Americans (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2020), 124.
93  
D’Amours, “Training for Operation Jubilee,” 22.
94  
Iceland was one of twelve original signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed
on 4 April 1949. See Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North
Atlantic Treaty, 1947-49 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 42-46.
91  
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surface and air escort into play.”95 That battleground saw countless
confrontations between Allied shipping and German U-boats over
the coming years. As the admiral predicted, the expanding Allied
presence on and around Iceland was a critical factor in several
hard-fought successes during that time. But the icy waters around
Iceland were also a graveyard for many men. On 24 May 1941, only
three men of a crew of 1,418 survived when HMS Hood, which often
anchored in Hvalfjördhur harbour north of Reykjavik, was sunk by
the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen during its ill-fated eastward dash
across the Denmark Straight towards Iceland.96 More than three
years later, in October 1944, HMCS Skeena was lost in a strong gale
while anchored not far off Iceland. Local Icelanders played heroic
efforts in saving the crew, although fifteen sailors lost their lives.97
Using the wind-swept Hvalfjördhur harbour as a relay point for
anti-submarine escorts, the Royal Navy pushed its convoy coverage
in the spring of 1941 to roughly 35 degrees west. However, as Marc
Milner writes, that still “left a gap westward to the limits of local
Canadian escort from Halifax and Sydney, which reached to the
Grand Banks.”98 The Newfoundland Escort Force, created in July
of that year by the Royal Canadian Navy, helped fill that gap by
coordinating escort duties with the Royal Navy and sharing facilities
at Hvalfjördhur.99 Henceforth, Iceland played a central role for mid-

W. A. B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, with Robert H. Caldwell, William
Johnston and William G. P. Rawling, No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational
History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943, Vol. II,
Part 1 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 2002), 180. The name of the admiral is
not mentioned in this reference.
96  
All three men were first shipped to Reykjavik for their initial recovery, then
off to Britain for further recovery and investigations into the sinking. “Tilburn,
Robert Ernest (Oral history),” IWM 11746, produced 4 December 1990, Oral
History Interviews, Imperial War Museum, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/
item/object/80011489.
97  
W. A. B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, with Robert H. Caldwell, William
Johnston and William G. P. Rawling, A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational
History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1943-1945, Vol. II,
Part 2 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 2007), 384-87.
98  
Marc Milner, “The Newfoundland Escort Force: Navy, Part 29,” Legion Magazine,
3 October 2008.
99  
W. G. D. Lund, “The Royal Canadian Navy’s Quest for Autonomy in the North
West Atlantic,” in RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968, ed. James Boutilier, (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 138-58; and Marc Milner, North Atlantic
Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1985), 41-43.
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ocean escorts for convoys shipping men and materiel between North
America and Britain, as well as for Arctic-bound convoys leaving
Hvalfjördhur and Reykjavik with critical supplies for the Soviet
Union along what became known as the “Murmansk Run.”100 The
strategic value of Iceland was also keenly evident in terms of Allied
air power. Canadian-built aerodromes were valuable for many years
and for many reasons. By July 1942, the RAF operated ten Liberator
planes out of Reykjavik to provide better protection for trans-Atlantic
convoys traveling through the air gap.101 The value of this Icelandbased, gap-diminishing capacity increased over the coming years.102
From 1941 onwards, these bases were frequently used as a stoppingoff location for trans-Atlantic flights, particularly for new planes being
flown from North America to Europe by Ferry Command pilots.
One personal account highlighted Iceland’s value as a stepping stone:
“The type of ship & the weather determines the route you take. I’ll
take the Iceland trip if possible. It is broken up over 3 days and the
hops are fairly short.”103
Using those aerodromes built by fellow Canadians early in the
war, Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron No. 162, temporarily
assigned to RAF Coastal Command, arrived in Reykjavik in early
1944. By the start of February, a total of 424 airmen of 162 Squadron
had arrived in Iceland and they moved between Iceland and Scotland
until the end of the war. Members of 162 Squadron were credited
with destroying six German U-boats during their time in Iceland
and Scotland and they were sent back to Canada in July 1945.104
As Marcelle Cinq-Mars, Senior Archivist at Library and Archives
Canada, writes, this ability to land and re-fuel in Iceland “underscored
the strategic value of Iceland for Allied Forces.”105
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1986), 581-610, 665.
105  
Cinq-Mars, “Canadians and the military occupation of Iceland (1940-1941)”.
100  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,

27

Canadian Military History, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3
28

Z Force on the Ground

pistol was never aimed at iceland
Germans never invaded Iceland in the end and they never bombed
Reykjavik.106 In other words, the Nazis did not actually point their
proverbial pistol at England, America and Canada from Iceland. Nor
did they seriously consider invading Iceland, even if the strategic
opportunities it represented were clear and tempting. This accords with
the view—and the hope—in Ottawa on the day Norway and Denmark
fell in April 1940 that it would be difficult for Germany to hold Iceland.107
There was a brief period in early summer 1940 when the
Germans discussed the possibility of taking Iceland. According
to captured German naval plans, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Kriegsmarine, Admiral Erich Raeder, was told on the afternoon of
12 June that the invasion of Iceland was under consideration at the
very highest levels and was to be given the cover name Ikarus. The
idea of seizing Iceland likely originated with Hitler himself without
any previous discussion with the Kriegsmarine. A deputy chief of
the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht told his American interrogators
after the war that Hitler “wanted to prevent anyone else from coming
there; in second place, he also wanted to use Iceland as an air base
for the protection of our submarines operating in that area.”108 Raeder
understood the arguments in favour of a German invasion of Iceland
as a counter-stroke to a British blockade, the risks of which presented
“a continuous and unbearable threat to German safety. It must be
broken ONCE AND FOR ALL.”109 To that end, his senior planners
suggested that “Iceland should be annexed and the Icelandic area
should be exploited as a naval and air base.”110
106  
Upwards of 230 Icelanders died during the war, mostly from cargo ship and
fishing accidents. See Gudni Th. Johannesson, The History of Iceland (Oxford:
Greenwood Press, 2013), 107.
107  
Hours after Denmark fell, Canadian officials in Ottawa believed the Germans
would be hard-pressed to control Iceland. See “Won’t Send Canadians Yet to Fight
on Norse Front,” Toronto Daily Star, 9 April 1940.
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Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 50.
109  
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(London: Greenhill, 1990), 20 June 1940, annex 2: Views of the Naval Staff on the
Policy of Bases, 65, as cited in Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 53. Capital
letters found in the original.
110  
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On balance, though, Raeder felt Iceland was a ‘bridge too far’
despite the allure of using the island to attack trans-Atlantic trade and,
quite possibly, North America itself. His concerns with Hitler’s Icelandic
ambitions were clear in the translated Kriegsmarine war diary of 12
June, the same day he was told about Hitler’s plans: “The risks involved
in conveying troops across a sea area dominated by the enemy are
incompatible with any results to be expected from the occupation.”111
Just over a week later, in a meeting with Hitler, Raeder said “it is
impossible to maintain continuous supplies. The entire Navy will have
to be used for operation ‘Ikarus’.”112 In other words, German leaders in
Berlin were deciding privately not to go to Iceland at almost the exact
same time King was speaking publicly in Ottawa about the urgent need
to send Canadians to Iceland to defend it. Raeder reiterated his view in
a subsequent meeting with Hitler on 26 September 1940, during which
Hitler agreed that “islands taken by the Luftwaffe in surprise attacks
can be held only by troops and materiel transported with the assistance
of the Navy.”113 For their part, the German air force planners felt it
was virtually impossible to build airfields in Iceland, not to mention
the heavy constraints on their resources posed by the ongoing air raids
over Britain.114 Realising they did not have capacity to take Iceland, the
Germans dropped the idea. Ikarus never got off the ground.
Had the Germans arrived en masse in Iceland during those tense
days of May and June 1940, they may have had a good chance of
taking it. Roger Rowley, a Canadian officer who served in Iceland,
certainly felt that way, as he laid out in an interview given in 2000:
“All they had to do was kill a few fellas before they got into the
mountains. And take Reykjavik and Akureyi and a couple of other
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places and the war was over.”115 Meanwhile, the men of the FMR
took a humorous approach in believing how they could fend off the
Germans. According to the battalion’s official history, they were
often heard saying “Si les Allemands viennent on pourra toujours
les égratinger!”116 Fortunately for Z Force and others, the Canadians
never had to contend with such a fate while in Iceland.

a final tally
In the end, a total of 2,653 Canadians—76 officers and 2,577 men—
served in Iceland between June 1940 and April 1941.117 The peak
number dwindled significantly as of 31 October when the RRC
and the FMR left Iceland to rejoin the 2nd Division in Britain.
The Camerons pulled out of Reykjavik harbour on 28 April 1941,
arriving three days later in Greenock, Scotland. Their war diarist,
no doubt weary from his challenging Icelandic sojourn, reported that
the men “enjoyed the sight of trees which they hadn’t seen for ten
months and as long as daylight lasted, faces were pressed to the train
windows as they drank in the scenery of the new country.”118
Canada’s initial Iceland deployment was over and the six men who
never came home from it are buried in Iceland: five in the Reykjavik
(Fossvogur) Cemetery and one in the Reydargjordur Cemetery in
eastern Iceland. A further forty-two Canadians—twenty-six from the
Royal Canadian Air Force, two from the Royal Canadian Navy and
fourteen from the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve—all of
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whom died in or near Iceland after the last Cameron pulled out in
April 1941, are also buried in Reykjavik.119
All three regiments represented in Z Force went on to play key
roles in other theatres. Members of the RRC and FMR stormed the
beaches of Dieppe in August 1942, but at very high costs indeed.120 The
FMR suffered the highest number of fatal and non-fatal casualties of
officers and men—a total of 584—of any single unit in that ill-fated
action. Meanwhile, the RRC, with a total of 556 casualties, suffered
the highest number of fatalities (227) of any unit.121 In Normandy less
than two years later, the Camerons, as divisional troops attached to
the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, provided suppressing fire support
and heavy mortars with their Vickers machine guns on D-Day as the
Canadians moved inland.122
The Canadian presence in Iceland—variously manifest on land,
on water and in the air—added considerable strategic value over time
to the larger war effort. And it began with the initial, ill-equipped
but well-intentioned military deployment in the summer of 1940—an
important chapter in a 1,000-year-old, trans-Atlantic story.
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